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Abstract: 
In this paper, based on report published by the Bulgarian National Audit Office with reference to 
public university graduates entering the labor market, I try to outline possible ways to overcome 
labor market failure problem forced by inefficient public university funding. It is the Bulgarian 
Government and in particular Ministry of Education, Youth and Science that perform policy to 
contribute to achieve postsecondary labor market equilibrium. Based on the report findings, I 
argue that the subsidies allocated for public universities are quite high compared to the funds 
adopted for health services for example.  
It is not the high acceptance rate that are being achieved, but the admission quotas that are being 
defined by universities. I consider this as a precondition for the labor market failure problem. 
Thus supply and demand on specialists with university degree on labor market is unbalanced. 
This creates risk for inadequate managerial decisions when developing strategies and policies in 
the fields of labor market and university education. As a result labor market is saturated with 
specialists with some occupations, and shortage with others.  
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1. Introduction 
In September 2013, Bulgarian National Audit Office (BNAO) has published an audit report 
claiming that only 25% from all university graduates had started their professional career on 
positions that require university diploma. The audit period was within 1
st
 Jan 2009 – 31st Dec 
2012. The report findings raise concern with reference to what extent Bulgarian Government, and 
in particular Ministry of Education, Youth and Science (MEYS) perform effective policy to 
contribute to achieve postsecondary labor market equilibrium. According to the report, within the 
studied period, Bulgarian Government had spent 678 million euro in forms of subsidies or 3 317 
euro per student, which is almost five times higher (see Appendix) compared with the adopted 
budget for health services within the same period – 711 euro per inhabitant. The aim of this paper 
is to show possible ways to overcome labor market failure problem forced by inefficient public 
university funding.     
Over the past two decades, university subsidization in Bulgaria has become a major policy 
issue. Its importance derives not just because postsecondary education contributes to an 
economy’s stock of knowledge and the productivity of its labor force, but also because 
universities play a vital role in national income formation and receive an important share of 
public sector expenditures. 
Traditional economics tend to regard a market as a robust mechanism of social choice. Rational 
utility-maximizing behavior leads to equilibrium and it is Pareto efficient. From society’s point of 
view, however, market failures may occur when outcome production differs from optimal. 
Market failures are cases when production of goods and services is too much or too little, 
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challenging the self-regulating capacity that economists usually associate with a market 
mechanism, i.e., the capacity to adjust to situations of excessive or insufficient supply or demand. 
A market failure problem could exist and persist because the benefit to society in terms of 
higher productivity and a higher GDP is un-priced by the market. This leads to the private 
optimum level of output being less than the social optimum level of production. The individual 
does not take into account the external benefits of higher education – they may not be aware of 
the social benefits or may underestimate their own private benefits – this is an example of 
information failure. 
After referring to the literature in Section 2, Section 3 illustrates the positive externalities 
impact on labor market as result of government intervention. Section 3, inter alia, outlines three 
possible reasons why the cost of government intervention into education markets may be greater 
than the benefits as well. Section 4 provides a deeper analysis of the Bulgarian government 
efficiency in postsecondary education and focuses on possible ways to overcome labor market 
failure problem forced by inefficient public university funding. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Much of the literature on educational returns recognizes that returns may vary across schooling 
levels and across persons with the same schooling level and therefore has focused on improving 
model specification by introducing heterogeneous return model.
1
 In traditional economic theory 
and empirics, Mincer equations2 are the most widely used in labor economics and economics of 
education. In leading economies (such as US, Japan, Germany, Canada, Finland, Australia) in 
                                                          
1 See Heckman, Smith, Clements, (1997), Blundell, Dearden, Goodman and Reed (2000); Blundell, Dearden and 
Sianesi (2001). 
2 Generally these equations explore and estimate the relationship between labor income, educational attainment and 
work experience in labor market. 
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terms of PISA index
3
, policies aimed at increasing the educational attainment and income, are the 
one that use specific measures and results namely from estimated Mincerian equations. The main 
challenge in the evaluation today is how to achieve precise specification of econometric models 
and the application of appropriate assessment methods. 
The models provided by Mincer (1974) have proved to be fundamental in literature.  Mincer 
along with Becker, Schultz and Rosen develop the concept of human capital and the internal rate 
of return to education (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964; Rosen, 1976; Becker, 1994). Within the 
period 1958 – 1974 he develops empirical models to assess the relationship between employee 
skills and their income. 
In the original theoretical model (Mincer, 1958), he explains why workers with different 
educational levels get different labor payment with differential income – employees with higher 
education get higher incomes. In this model the economic reality is simple – all students have the 
same ability to learn, the same opportunities to realize, equal access to finance, there is no 
uncertainty in the business environment in terms of future incomes of employees, the benefits of 
education remains constant, and what makes the jobs different is the required educational level 
only. 
Salmi and Hauptman (2006) researched a compounding issue related to the inefficiency 
associated with the subsidising of tertiary level education (TLE). Essentially, the demand for 
postsecondary education is increasing “far faster than the ability or willingness of governments 
to provide public resources” (Salmi and Hauptman 2006, 1) to meet this demand. The increased 
demand has been accredited to: the faster growth in future economic value attributed to a 
                                                          
3 The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a worldwide study by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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postsecondary degree as opposed to that of a secondary level graduate; the changing of cultural 
attitude towards the attainment of postsecondary education to improve one’s social welfare and 
the attempt of government to steer university curricula toward areas with human resource gaps 
(Salmi and Hauptman, 2006). 
According to Bloom and Sevilla (2004), if government chooses the way of subsidising 
postsecondary education, aiming at realization of true benefit, three main conditions must be met. 
Positive net return to the public on the investment made into the society comes as first. The 
second condition is that persons must have “insufficient ability or incentive” (Bloom and Sevilla 
2004, 135) to satisfy the socially optimal level of investment in postsecondary education on 
private level. Thirdly, the investment must generate levels of net social benefits which outweigh 
that of alternative uses of public funds. 
Prior to writing his paper, Dougherty (2004) insists on the fact that US has also experienced 
changes in their funding schemes for higher education focusing on the changes in the amount of 
public funding offered to universities. He highlights the significant decrease in the share of public 
funding to the universities while emphasising the movement toward funding institutions based on 
performance. In turn, universities have sought to increase tuitions, cut costs by outsourcing 
services and seek private funding. 
Madgett and Blanger (2008) describe the case of Canada in the fact that there are two tiers of 
government: federal and provincial. Also different Canadian provinces have different rules with 
regards to funding and tuition fees for postsecondary education. However, the use of a system 
focused primarily on loans, as opposed to government grants, still exists. Reductions in transfer 
payments to provinces directed toward health and higher education began in the late 1980s under 
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the Mulroney government, eventually leading to a reduction in direct public funding to higher 
education from 80% to 60% “within a few years” (Madgett and Blanger, 2008). As a 
consequence, tertiary level institutions increased tuition fees. Between 2008/09 and 2012/13 
average undergraduate tuition fees for fulltime students in Canada increased from CAN$4,747 to 
CAN$5,581 (Statistics Canada, 2012). Students are therefore charged for tuition but have access 
to Governmen loans which they must generally start repaying six months after the completion of 
their degree. 
Focusing on the eastern hemisphere in the financial crisis, Wang (2009) emphasizes that China 
universitites funding was affected as the rate of growth of funding decreased in 2008 (UNESCO 
2012). China has the largest higher education system in the world (Wang, 2009) with over 3,000 
universities in 2006 enrolling 25.4 million students. Within the period of late 1980s and early 
1990s, China pioneered its “dual track” enrolment policy aiming at students who does not meet 
the minimum grades in the national university entrance examinations would pay their tuition. 
However, this system was amended in 1997 so that all students were made to pay tuition fees. 
Over time the share of public funding to public universities has been decreasing while the share 
of tuition funding has been increasing. Though it is still the major source of funding for public 
institutions, public expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure has decreased from 91.81% in 
1993 to 42.77% in 2005 while the proportion from tuition and fees increased from 6.81% in 1993 
to 31.05% in 2005 (Wang, 2009). 
Return to education is in line with one of the most relevant issues in the economic literature. 
The important point here is that people differ with respect to their marginal return to education, 
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their marginal cost for education and their taste and choices
4
, hence the return to education is not 
a single parameter but can potentially differ according to differences in the individuals’ family 
backgrounds . Some individuals may be able to access funds from family or other sources in 
order to acquire additional education, while others are unable to do so (Eren, 2009). With this 
reference, other substantial parameters that deserve mentioning are: social stratification, respect 
for law, independent judiciary, free elections, pluralism, freedom for the press, health etc., but 
since they are not in the scope of this paper I will not address them further. 
3. Labor Market Failure as a Result of Government Involvement 
Positive externаlities occur when аn externаl benefit is generаted by the producer of a good but 
becаuse there is no mаrket for the externаlity the producer cаnnot get compensаted for producing 
this extrа benefit. In cаses where the production of а good causes positive externаlities, the 
mаrket price of the good will not reflect its true vаlue аnd аn underproduction will occur. Thе 
positivе еxtеrnаlity аrgumеnt is pеrhаps thе most commonly citеd justificаtion for govеrnmеnt 
involvеmеnt in еducаtion (Poterbа, 1996). Although positive externalities mаy tаke mаny forms, 
they cаn essentiаlly be clаssified into two groups. First, it is thаt educаtion increаses civic 
engаgement аnd thereby contributes to а stаble аnd democrаtic society (Friedman, 1962: 86). The 
second аrgument is thаt аnd educаted workforce is vitаl for the creаtion аnd аdoption of new 
technologies – economic growth (Hanushek, 2002: 2065; Goldin and Katz, 2010; Kukulska-
Hulme, 2012). 
Where substantial positive externalities exist, the good or service may be under-consumed by 
people or under-provided since the free market may fail to take into account their effects. This is 
                                                          
4 In practice, economic returns to education can vary across people due to a number of unobserved factors, such as 
ability, motivation, and ambition, as well as differences in the interest rate faced by different individuals (Card, 
2001). 
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because the social marginal benefits (SMB) of consuming the good are greater than private 
marginal benefits (PMB). An example of positive externalities arising from the consumption of 
education is shown in Figure 1. In the example, a consumer benefits from education that 
increases productivity causing SMB to rise.  
 
Figure 1: Positive Externalities Diagram 
 
 
Figure 1 describes the demand curve D as a measure of the overall benefits of education, and 
the supply curve S which equals private marginal cost (PMC) and social marginal cost (SMC) as 
a measure of the overall costs of that same activity. The demand represents private marginal 
benefits (PMB) and the costs and benefits illustrated by the curves are only those experienced by 
producer (universities) and consumer (students) directly involved in the activity. A positive 
externality increases the social benefits from education, so an adjusted demand curve which 
includes the positive externalities would lie farther in the diagram, reflecting a lower social price 
at each quantity (SMB). 
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One may compare a regular demand curve with SMB and discover that education is being 
under-produced in relation to the price consumers are paying. In both cases, the curves show that, 
while the market may be working efficiently as far as producer  and consumer are concerned, it is 
working inefficiently for society as a whole. 
The private optimum occurs where the PMB equals PMC, giving an output of Q1. At this level 
of output, the distance AB represents the size of the external benefit. For society as a whole 
though the social optimum is where SMB equals SMC at output Q2.  
The socially optimal level of output is where SMB equals SMC. If we sum up the excess of 
SMB over PMB between Q1 and Q2 we arrive at a figure that indicates the deadweight loss to 
society. This is the triangle ABC. Society as a whole could be made better off by increasing the 
current level of output from Q1 to Q2 because deadweight loss to society depends on the elasticity 
of S. The more inelastic the S curve, the smaller the deadweight loss to society.  
Evеn if onе could concludе thаt thеrе wеrе positivе еxtеrnаlitiеs from еducаtion аnd thаt thosе 
еxtеrnаlitiеs wеrе Pаrеto-rеlеvаnt, thе mаgnitudе of thе mаrkеt fаilurе must bе wеighеd аgаinst 
thе аbility of govеrnmеnt to providе rеmеdy (High, 1985). In thеory, govеrnmеnt would solvе а 
mаrkеt fаilurе by dеtеrmining thе solution thаt mаximizеs sociаl wеlfаrе аnd thеn implеmеnting 
thаt solution. In prаcticе, howеvеr, govеrnmеnt frеquеntly lаcks thе аbility to еvеn dеtеrminе thе 
solution thаt mаximizеs sociаl wеlfаrе, lеt аlonе implеmеnt it. 
Thе rеlеvаnt quеstion thаt comеs nеxt is not whеthеr govеrnmеnt fаils, but rаthеr whеthеr thе 
costs of govеrnmеnt intеrvеntion in thе mаrkеt plаcе еxcееd thе bеnеfits (Hosein and Franklin, 
2010). Thеrе аrе thrее rеаsons why thе costs of govеrnmеnt intеrvеntion into еducаtion mаrkеts 
аrе likеly to bе grеаtеr thаn thе bеnеfits. Thе first rеаson is thаt thе govеrnmеnt doеs not possеss 
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thе nеcеssаry informаtion to dеtеrminе thе bеst, or еvеn а closе аpproximаtion, to thе solution to 
thе sociаl wеlfаrе mаximizаtion problеm (Cavallo, 2008). In thе contеxt of еducаtion, еvеn if it 
wеrе truе thаt thе аmount of еducаtion obtаinеd аbsеnt govеrnmеnt intеrvеntion, it would bе 
bеlow thе sociаlly optimаl lеvеl; govеrnmеnt doеs not possеss thе rеquisitе knowlеdgе nеcеssаry 
to rеаch thаt sociаlly optimаl lеvеl. Thе govеrnmеnt doеs not know which individuаl to subsidizе 
аnd how much of а subsidy to providе in ordеr to mаximizе sociаl wеlfаrе. Thе dаtа nеcеssаry to 
dеtеrminе who to subsidizе do not еvеn еxist аnd would bе еxtrеmеly costly, if not possiblе, for 
govеrnmеnt to obtаin duе to incеntivеs for prеfеrеncе fаlsificаtion аmong potеntiаl subsidy 
rеcipiеnts. 
Thе sеcond rеаson why govеrnmеnt intеrvеntion into thе еducаtion mаrkеtplаcе is likеly to bе 
morе costly thаn thе privаtе solution, еvеn аssuming mаrkеt fаilurе, is thаt thе solution 
implеmеntеd by thе govеrnmеnt is dеtеrminеd not by sociаl wеlfаrе but by politicаl 
considеrаtions (Young аnd Block, 1999; Milligan et. al., 2004). In prаcticе, еducаtion policy is 
not dеtеrminеd by а bеnеvolеnt еducаtionаl plаnnеr but rаthеr by thе sеlf-intеrеst of thе politicаl 
clаss аnd thеir supportеrs (Dee, 2004). If thе lеvеl of еducаtion provision dеtеrminеd through thе 
politicаl procеss is highеr thаn thе sociаlly optimаl lеvеl, thеn on nеt thе vаluе of thе аdditionаl 
еducаtion mаy bе nеgаtivе. 
Thе third rеаson to distrust thе аbility of govеrnmеnt to bе аblе to providе а morе еfficiеnt 
solution is bеcаusе аllocаting аdditionаl rеsourcеs to еducаtion mеаns thаt rеsourcеs hаvе to bе 
rеdirеctеd from othеr usе. Assuming thаt govеrnmеnt would bе аblе to dеtеrminе thе solution 
thаt mаximizеs sociаl wеlfаrе аnd would bе аblе to implеmеnt thаt solution, it is not clеаr thаt thе 
costs of implеmеnting thаt solution would not еxcееd thе bеnеfits obtаinеd from thаt solution. 
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Pеrhаps morе importаntly, if аn individuаl vаluеs аltеrnаtivе usеs of thеir incomе morе thаn 
thе positivе еxtеrnаlitiеs gеnеrаtеd by univеrsity еducаtion, thеn thе positivе еxtеrnаlitiеs аrе not 
Pаrеto-rеlеvаnt (Buchаnаn аnd Stubblеbinе, 1962). It is gеnеrаlly not еfficiеnt for аn individuаl 
to consumе еducаtion until thе mаrginаl bеnеfit is zеro. A rаtionаl individuаl will аcquirе 
еducаtion until thе mаrginаl bеnеfit of thе еxtrа unit of еducаtion is еquаl to thе mаrginаl cost of 
thаt еducаtion. Just bеcаusе thе sociаl bеnеfit to аn аdditionаl unit of еducаtion is positivе doеs 
not mеаn thаt it is еfficiеnt to rеquirе thаt individuаl to аcquirе morе еducаtion. If thаt individuаl 
would vаluе doing somеthing еlsе morе thаn spеnding thаt timе in clаss, it is not еfficiеnt to 
subsidizе аdditionаl еducаtion. 
Combinеd, thеsе thrее rеаsons suggеst thаt thе cost of а govеrnmеnt solution to аn аllеgеd 
mаrkеt fаilurе with rеspеct to еducаtion is likеly to еxcееd thе bеnеfit аssociаtеd with thе 
implеmеntаtion of thе govеrnmеnt rеsponsе. Policy mаkеrs fаil to considеr thе аbility of 
govеrnmеnt to dеtеrminе аnd implеmеnt а solution thаt mаximizеs sociаl wеlfаrе аnd thus 
ovеrеstimаtе thе аbility of govеrnmеnt intеrvеntion into еducаtion mаrkеts to improvе sociаl 
wеlfаrе. A morе rеаlistic undеrstаnding of thе nаturе аnd limitаtions of govеrnmеnt show thаt 
govеrnmеnt intеrvеntion into postsecondary еducаtion mаrkеts is unlikеly to providе bеnеfits 
sufficiеnt to ovеrcomе thе costs of аny mаrkеt fаilurе. 
4. Bulgarian Government Efficiency in High Education  
In the transition years, we have seen a massive restructuring of the economy and the labor 
market. Low incomes in Bulgaria, measured by GDP per capita
5
, often brings feeling that return 
to education is insignificant. The application of Mincer econometric model, however, clearly 
                                                          
5 As of 2012 according to the World Bank statistics, GDP per capita in Bulgaria is $ 6 986 in current prices, while 
the leading countries have respectively: US - $ 49 965; Japan - $ 46 720; Germany - $ 41 514; Finland - $ 46 179; 
Canada - $ 52 219; Australia - $ 67 036.  
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confirms the established relation to other economies, namely that postsecondary education is 
associated with higher levels of income. On average, returns to education estimates at 3-4% 
increase in income for one additional year of education (Simeonova-Ganeva & Panayotova, 
2009).  
As of September 2013 there are 51 accredited universities in Bulgaria.
6
 Table 2 in the 
Appendix shows that the average acceptance rate of public universities for the studied period is 
96%, while private universities accept on average 87%. It is not the high acceptance rate that are 
being achieved, but the admission quotas that are being defined by universities. One may 
consider this as a precondition for the market failure problem. Supply and demand on specialists 
with university degree on labor market is unbalanced. This creates risk for inadequate managerial 
decisions when developing strategies and policies in the fields of labor market and university 
education. Thus, labor market is saturated with specialists with some occupations, and shortage 
with others (Mandelman and Zanetti, 2010).  
The structure of the approved and realized admission of students in public universities is 
divided in nine areas of high education, presented in Table 3 in the Appendix. Social, Economic 
and Legal Studies has the largest share from the approved admission quotas on national level, 
taking 34-35%, and 35-36% from the realized admission in all areas of the high education. This 
trend remained constant throughout the surveyed period. The total number of all enrolled students 
for the surveyed period in both – public and private universities is presented in Table 4 in the 
Appendix. 69% of the students are full-time enrolled, while 31% are part time. There has been 
decreasing tendency in students’ enrollment rates throughout the years.  
                                                          
6 According to Ministry of Education, Youth and Science: http://www.mon.bg/en/ 
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  As High Education Regulation in Bulgaria had been amended several times, still there are not 
any defined functions of government with relation to optimization (merging) of universities. This 
is closely connected with the admission of students and the labor market demand. Government 
need to participate more effectively in terms of public university management and to modify its 
control mechanism. The financial model that had been deployed about decreasing government 
subsidy if universities tend to accept more students than the submitted capacity is inadequate and 
causes government budget losses. 
Another problem that deserves further discussion is the level of knowledge that university 
graduates acquire. When students leave university they are theoretically prepared for the labor 
market but practical experience is missing. And this is in contrast to what business expects. To 
overcome this issue, one might consider development of better strategy for effective realization 
on the labor market. 
Yet, there is no unified strategy for the Higher Education in Bulgaria. Currently, Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Science performs its policy based on a number of governmental decisions, 
programs and specific sectoral strategic documents. The lack of active involvement of the 
Ministry to promote cooperation between public universities and business does not provide 
adequate conditions to prepare students for real work environment. Possible solution for policy 
makers is a transparent effective management of higher education and overall revision of the 
strategy about the admissible quotas that universities are supposed to define. 
In terms of youth employment (aged 15-24) Bulgaria is above European Union average (see 
Table 5 in the Appendix). This fact should not give government positive signals about the 
situation on the labor market  because on one side, referring to the beginning of this paper there is 
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clear problem with postsecondary education strategy, and on the other – labor market does not 
faces equilibrium in terms of high qualified specialists. 
5. Conclusion 
Much like the housing bubble in United States, postsecondary education in Bulgaria is fueled by 
government subsidies, publicly-backed loans and incentives that say everyone should be doing 
something. Doubtlessly, this has an impact on labor market, recently proved by a report published 
by Bulgarian National Audit Office. Labor market failure problem, as a result of inefficient 
public university funding, tend to be disregarded by policy makers leading to saturation of 
specialists with some occupations, and shortage with others. 
Since there is no clear postsecondary education regulation, unification of all regulations in 
Bulgaria is missing, universities are facing the challenge to accept more students. A deep revision 
of both – admission control mechanism and optimization (merging) university strategy is a 
considerable option within governmental program.  
It is an open question whether the redistribution of 678 million euro in forms of subsidies from 
taxpayers to universities within four academic years is a desirable outcome. Prior to start seeking 
answers to that question, Bulgarian government should think of another potential problem – 
migration of high educated workforce. Education, in turn, is a main determinant of wages, both in 
the country of origin and the potential country the individual is prone to migrate in (Dustmann 
and Glitz, 2011). Higher earners contribute more to tax and benefit systems, and may increase per 
capita GDP. Although the decisions about how much education to obtain and whether to migrate 
are often sequential, individuals may in many cases make these choices simultaneously, choosing 
education at home with a view to migrating later (Dustmann and Glitz, 2011). 
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Future research may also investigate the economic profile of non-marginal students in 
Bulgarian’s public universities. If such redistribution is considered to be highly ineffective (or is 
deemed to be contrary to egalitarian goals), then more analysis is needed on whether it is possible 
to distinguish between marginal and non-marginal students, with the objective of finding ways to 
reduce subsidies to the marginal. This may be a difficult distinction to make in practice, and the 
political framework of trying to alter subsidies in this way could be quite large. I leave this to 
future research, not only by economists, but by political scientists and other social scientists. 
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7. Appendix: 
Table 1: Total numbers of admissions and accepted students in both Public and Private 
Universities in Bulgaria 
Year 
Population 
 in Bulgaria* 
Budget for Health Services 
in Bulgaria** 
                             /in EUR/ 
2009                        7 563 710                                  1 264 395 679      
2010                        7 504 868                                  1 315 150 601      
2011                        7 327 224                                  1 346 604 766      
2012                        7 284 552                                  1 346 604 766      
* Source: NSI 
** Source: National Health Insurance Fund 
 
 
 
Table 2: Total numbers of admissions and accepted students in both Public and Private 
Universities in Bulgaria 
Year 
Admission 
(in numbers) 
Accepted  
students 
Public Universities Private Universities 
    in numbers % Admission Accepted % Admission Accepted % 
2009/2010          65 167               65 610      101          52 848               50 297      95       12 319            15 313      124 
2010/2011          66 371               62 014      93          52 005               50 113      96       14 366            11 901      83 
2011/2012          71 780               64 369      90          54 590               51 996      95       17 190            12 373      72 
2012/2013          70 259               64 851      92          54 237               51 992      96       16 022            12 859      80 
Total    273 577         256 844      94    213 680         204 398      96    59 897         52 446      87 
 Source: NSI 
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Table 3: Structure of the approved and realized admission of students in public universities by 
areas: 
 
  Source: NSI 
 
 
Table 4: Total number of students in all Bulgarian universities for the period 2009-2013 
Academic Year Full-time Part-time Total 
2009/2010 177 322 86 699 264 021 
2010/2011 181 277 82849 264 126 
2011/2012 182 774 79 532 262 306 
2012/2013 180 765 77 471 258 236 
  722 138 326 551 1 048 689 
        Source: NSI 
 
Areas of  High 
Education 
2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 
Admission 
quota 
Accepted 
Admission 
quota 
Accepted 
Admission 
quota 
Accepted 
Admission 
quota 
Accepted 
Educational Sciences      5 118           5 041           4 937           4 887           4 917           4 753           5 028           4 814      
Humanities      4 028           3 578           3 957           3 731           4 075           3 719           4 138           3 806      
Social, Economic and 
Law, incl: 
   17 841         17 627         17 966         17 906         19 333         18 808         18 594         18 100      
-Business 
Administration 
     2 646           2 649           3 002           2 893           2 825           2 644           2 616           2 498      
- Economics      9 518           9 467           9 222           9 311         10 390         10 163           9 960           9 684      
Mathematics and 
 Informatics 
     4 168           3 706           4 060           3 776           4 231           3 947           4 402           3 927      
Technical Science    14 920         11 789         14 095         12 846         14 700         13 527         14 649         13 992      
Agricultural sciences 
and  
Veterinary Medicines 
     1 596           1 554           1 604           1 581           1 670           1 658           1 701           1 653      
Health and Sport      3 424           3 470           3 550           3 620           3 821           3 811           3 913           3 944      
Arts      1 121           1 002           1 120           1 077           1 152           1 080           1 181           1 131      
Security and Defense         632              602              716              689              691              693              631              625      
Unallocated admitted 
 Students 
       1 928                  
     52 848         50 297         52 005         50 113         54 590         51 996         54 237         51 992      
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Table 5: Youth employment (aged 15-24) of all students that has graduated university within 2009 – 2012 
    2009 2010 2011 2012 
European Union (28 countries) % 58 56.9 55.5 54.5 
Belgium % 53 53.8 53.1 47.6 
Bulgaria % 75.4 63.5 58.5 62 
Czech Republic % 37.6 36.3 39 37.3 
Denmark % 77.3 67.7 72 70.2 
Germany % 77.8 75.2 78.5 76.2 
Estonia % 68.1 55 62 61.4 
Ireland % 66.7 61.7 63.8 63 
Greece % 56.1 47.8 44.5 41.5 
Spain % 48.5 45.6 41.2 38.1 
France % 49.1 49.8 48.9 48.7 
Croatia % 58.2 56.2 40.5 37.4 
Italy % 24.9 25.3 22.7 23.1 
Cyprus % 67.7 65 58.1 56.4 
Latvia % 65.7 71.4 67.8 70 
Lithuania % 70.6 62.2 68.3 67 
Luxembourg % 56.3 46.7 45.9 45.3 
Hungary % 61.4 57 57.5 54.4 
Malta % 72.7 65.9 75.2 74.4 
Netherlands % 80.2 76.3 76.9 77.9 
Austria % 63.1 63.3 66.1 71.6 
Poland % 59 52.6 48.1 45.6 
Portugal % 50.4 47 49.9 37.4 
Romania % 56.4 44.8 42.5 39.7 
Slovenia % 71.8 60 53.9 53.7 
Slovakia % 42.7 30.8 23.7 23.2 
Finland % 78.8 79 80.6 74.2 
Sweden % 53.6 56.8 58.5 55.3 
United Kingdom % 71.8 72.6 70 71.6 
                      Source: Eurostat 
